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2Brian Motley and Robert H. Rasche'"
This paper develops two alternative proceduresfor making short-term
predictions of the M1 money stock and compares their forecasting
peiformanceovertheperiodfrom1981 to 1984. Theftrstprocedure is the
Rasche-Johannes money multiplier approach while the second involves
the simulation ofa structuralmodelofthe money marketdeveloped atthe
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Although the money market
model provided better forecasts in 1983 and 1984, neither model is
clearly dominant over the other. However, the relatively large forecast
errors ofboth models suggest that the Federal Reserve's ability to "ftne-
tune" the money stock in the short run is very limited.
During the last ten years, and especially in the
period from October 1979 to October 1982, the
Federal Reserve System has stated its policy objec-
tives in terms of the growth rates of monetary
aggregates. During most ofthis time, the principal
emphasis has been on M1, which consists of the
public's holdings of currency and checking
accounts, and thus represents ameasure ofthe stock
of "transactions money" outstanding. Since varia-
tions in the growth of M1 have been found histor-
ically to be closely related to variations in the
growth of nominal GNP, the Federal Reserve has
sought to affect the course ofoutput and prices by
influencing the growth ofthis aggregate.
Since the bulk of MI consists of checking
accounts, which are the liabilities ofprivate deposi-
tory institutions, the Federal Reserve cannot
directly control the stock of t~ansactions money
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outstanding. The central bank can, however, affect
the money stock indirectly, through its influence
over both the public's demand to hold money and
the private banking system's ability and willingness
to supply checking accounts.
Depository institutions are required to hold
reserves equal to specified proportions ofcertain of
their deposit liabilities, and the supply of these
reserves is controlled by the Federal Reserve. When
the Federal Reserve's Trading Desk buys securities
in the open market, it increases the quantity ofbank
reserves because the transaction is settled by credit-
ing the reserve account the seller'sbank maintains at
its Federal Reserve Bank. Similarly, when the cen-
tral bank lowers the discount rate it charges for
short-term borrowing by private depository institu-
tions, the lower rate will tend, everything else being
equal, to lead to a greatervolume ofsuch borrowing
and thus, to a larger stock of bank reserves. Both
ways of increasing the supply of reserves not only
add to the quantity of deposit liabilities that the
private banking system is able to supply but also,
because they cause short-term interest rates to fall,
increase the amount ofMI that the public demands
to hold.The effects on Ml growth of changes in interest
rates and the supply ofbank reserves do not occur
instantaneously. Instead, theytlmd to be spreadover
aperiodofseveral months inapatternthatcannotbe
predicted precisely. As a result, close short-run
control ofthe stock ofM1, such as was attempted in
the 1979-82 period, requires the Federal Reserve
continually to forecast the likely course of Ml
growth in the weeks and months ahead. When the
forecast indicates that Ml is likely to deviate from
the target set by the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC), the Trading Desk must adjust the
supply of reserves with a view to bringing the
aggregate back toward target. Thus, the success of
policymakers in controlling Ml growth depends
heavily on their ability to make accurate short-run
forecasts.
Closer short-run control ofthe money stock after
October 1979 was generallyexpected to make inter-
est rates more variable (because the central bank
would no longer accommodate short-run shocks to
financial markets), and M1 growth less variable. In
fact, although the Federal Reserve was "control-
ling" Ml, the aggregate remained volatile, and
unanticipated month-to-month fluctuations in its
growth rate continued.
The fact that control ofM1is necessarily indirect
and requires the use offorecasts suggests one rea-
son) for this (at the time) surprising outcome. Ifthe
Federal Reserve cannot forecast M1 well enough to
choose the correct settings ofthe discount rate and
the stock ofreserves needed to keep Ml close to its
short-run targets, the central bank may destabilize
the aggregate as it tries to control it.
It must be recognized, however, that while the
ability to make good forecasts ofM1is necessary to
the successful short-run control ofthe aggregate, it
is not sufficient. Successful short-run control also
depends on the operating instrument the Federal
Reserve chooses to use. For an exhaustive discus-
sionofvarious instruments, see David Lindsey and
others (1981).
This paperseeks to throw light on the relationship
between forecasts ofM1and short-runcontrolofthe
monetary aggregate. It studies two methods for
forecasting and compares their respective 3-
months-ahead forecasting performance over the
period from 1981 to 1984.2 One model is a reduced
form, money multiplier model; the other is a struc-
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tural model ofthe supply of and demand for bank
reserves and the principal monetary aggregates.
Both models have been used in the past for
predicting MI.3 The first is a variant ofthe money-
mUltiplier componentmodel that was developed by
Johannes and Rasche (1979, 1981). That model is
employed regularly by Rasche to develop forecasts
ofMl as background for deliberations of the
"Sha.dow" Open Market Committee - a group of
privateeconomistswho meetperiodicallytodiscuss
th~ Federal Reserve's monetary policy. The second
model is the San Francisco Money Market Model,
developed by Judd and Scadding (1981, 1982,
1984), that is used regularly by the staffofthe San
Francisco Federal Reserve Bank to make short-run
forecasts ofthemonetary aggregates and to examine
the likely effect ofalternative policy actions.
For each of the four years 1981 to 1984, we
estimated each model using data extending through
December ofthe preceding year. In the case ofthe
monetary aggregates and reserves series, we used
the data actually available at the time. 4 For income
and prices, we used the data available now(Septem-
ber 1985) since complete historical series were not
easily accessible. Data on interest rates are never
revised. Each estimated model for each ofthe four
sample periods was then used to make four separate
three-months-ahead forecasts of Ml in the year
following the end of the sample period with infor-
mation through December, March, June, and Sep-
tember, respectively. Thus, for each model, sixteen
separate 3-months-ahead forecasts ofMl were con-
structed.
For each 3-months-ahead forecast, we used the
reserves and monetary aggregates data actually
available at the beginning ofthe periodto which the
forecast refers. For example, in projecting Ml
growth over the three months from June to Septem-
ber 1983, we assumedthatthe forecaster was able to
use the revised money stockdatathrough December
1982 published in February 1983 and the prelim-
inary datafor January-June 1983 publishedmonthly
overthat period. The former set ofdata was used to
estimate the parameters ofthe two models, whereas
the latter was used as the base for simulating the
models.
The resulting forecasts were compared both with
the preliminary actual data published immediately
after each 3-month forecast period and with therevised data issued at the beginning ofthe succeed-
ing year. Their accuracy was measured by exam-
iningtheforecasterrors both overeachyearand over
the four years as a whole.
The next sectionofthe paper outlines the princi-
pal features ofthe two models used in our forecast-
ing experiments. Sections II and III describe the
estimation and simulation of each model in detail.
The simulation results are set out in Tables 3-5 and
discussed in the second last section. Our calcula-
tions show thatthe money marketmodel would have
provided more accurate M1 forecasts over the
1981-84 period, but that the errors from both mod-
els were sufficiently large to make close short-run
control of Ml growth by the central bank quite
difficult. The final section ofthe paper summarizes
our results and offers some concluding comments.
I. The Models
Ml = m· R
In the multiplier component approach of
Johannes and Rasche, the stock ofMl is modeled as
the product of a money multiplier and a reserve
aggregate:
where
k the ratio of the currency component of
M1 to the transactions deposit compo-
nent
tc the ratio of nonbank travelers checks to
the currency component of Ml (for
1982-84 only).
rb the ratio of nonborrowed reserves
(adjusted for changes in reserve require-
Accordingto this decomposition, all changes in Ml
reflect changes either in the reserve aggregate -
assumed to be under actual or potential Federal
Reserve control - or in the money multiplier. In a
1981 contribution, Johannes and Rasche arguedthat
the multiplier may be forecasted with sufficient
accuracy to make it possible for the Federal Reserve
to control the growth of Ml quite closely over
periods ofsix months to a year.
In this paper's version of the model, the reserve
aggregate employed is the stock of nonborrowed
reserves, adjusted for changes in reserve require-
ments, plus the quantity ofextended-credit borrow-
ingsfrom Federal Reserve Banks. This is the reserve
aggregate used by the Federal Reserve as its short-
runoperating instrumentin the periodfrom October
1979 to October 1982. Using this reserve aggregate,
the money multiplier is defined as
ments) plus extended credit borrowings
to total deposits (M3 + government
deposits + foreign deposits - currency
- nonbank travelers checks).
tl the ratio of the difference between M2
and Ml to transactions deposits
t2 the ratio of the difference between M3
and M2 to transactions deposits
g the ratio ofU.S. government deposits at
commercial banks to transactions
deposits
z the ratio of fdreign deposits at commer-
cial banks to transactions deposits
An ARIMA model was estimated for each of
these component ratios for each offour overlapping
sample periods ending in December 1980 to
December 1983. That is, each component was mod-
eled a<; a linear function of its own past values.
These estimated models then were used to generate
3-months ahead forecasts of the components and
thus ofthecompletemultiplier. The stockofnonbor-
rowed reserves plus extended credit was treated as
exogenously determined by the Federal Reserve.
Although the components of the money multi-
plierare influenced by the behaviorofthe non-bank
public (whichlargely determines k, tl , t2 andtc), the
"spirit" ofthe multiplierapproach is thatchanges in
the stock ofMl are caused mainly by changes in the
quantity ofreserves available to the banking system
to support transactions deposits, and thus, that the
stockofMl is determined primarily from the supply
side.
The second model used in the forecasting experi-
ment, the San Francisco Money MarketModel, is a
structural model that describes the behavior of the
(2) m =__ l_+_k-'.(_l_+_t.:.;:.c,,-)__
rb(l + tl + t2 + g + z)
40public, the banking system and the Federal Reserve
in the markets for money, reserves and bank credit.
A unique feature ofthis model is that MI is viewed
as serving a "buffer-stock" function in the public's
asset portfolio. In the short-run, the public is
assumed passively to accept at least part of any
changes in the supply of money brought about by
variations in the quantity ofbankcreditoutstanding.
Suppose, for example, there were an increase in the
public's demandforloans which the banking system
accommodates. The model posits that the public
will hold a portion ofthe resulting rise in the supply
of money temporarily without a change in interest
rates (see Judd 1984), even though there has beenno
permanent increase in its demand to hold money
balances. The public's willingness to hold "extra"
money is due to the transactions costs associated
with adjusting money balances quickly to desired
levels. Also, although individual transactors can
alter their money holdings by varying their rate of
spendingon goods and services, the nonbank public
as a group cannot do so.
The SanFranciscomodel may be used to generate
forecasts ofM1growth underavariety ofalternative
assumptions about the Federal Reserve's short-run
operating procedure. In most recent years, the
Federal Reserve's short-run policy - although
seeking to keep M1growth within an annual target
range - has generally been concerned with influ-
encing money marketconditions rather than closely
controlling bank reserves or money on a month-to-
month basis. This certainly was true prior to Octo-
ber 1979, when the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) directed the Trading Desk to keep the
federal funds rate within a very narrow range
through manipulating the supply ofreserves. It also
has been largely true since October 1982, when the
operating instrument has been the level ofborrowed
reserves. (The current operating procedure is
described in Wallich, 1984.) As Motley and Bisig-
nano noted recently (1985), the use of discount
window borrowing as the System's short-run oper-
ating objective is similar to a funds rate control
procedure because it requires short-run variations in
the banking system's demand for reserves to be
accommodated by variations in the supply ofnon-
borrowed reserves. This means that shocks to the
reserves market are not permitted to affect the funds
rate.
BetweenOctober6, 1979 and the fall of1982, the
Federal Reserve's operating instrument was the sup-
ply ofnonborrowed reserves rather than the federal
funds rate. However, given its short-run money
stockobjectives, the Federal Reserve did notchoose
its target for nonborrowed reserves by projecting the
money multiplier from its own past values as the
Rasche-Johannes procedure would have recom-
mended (see Rasche-Johannes, 1981). Instead, the
Federal Reserve believed that changes in the supply
of nonborrowed reserves affected the money stock
through changing interest rates, and thus altering
the underlying demand to hold transactions money.
The nonborrowed reserves procedure therefore was
similar in many ways to one in which the Federal
Reserve varied the funds rate to attain its money
stock objectives.
These considerations led us to treat the federal
funds rate as exogenous inall the forecasting experi-
ments with the San Francisco model. In effect, the
federal funds rate that emerged in any given month
was assumed to be the rate which the Federal
Reserve believed at the time was required to attain
its short-run Ml targets
II. Estimating and Forecasting with the Multiplier Model
To forecast M1 with the money multiplier forecast. We used the same specifications of the
approach requires the use of separate forecasts of ARIMA models for all of the estimation periods.
each of the component ratios that make up the Results from various subsequent diagnostic tests of
multiplier expression in equation 2. These forecasts the estimated equations supportedthisprocedure by
were provided by dynamic simulations of an esti- indicating that the structure of the models did not
mated ARIMA model for each component ratio. change. The parameter estimates for each of the
Each of the estimation sample periods for these samples are given in Table 1.
models started in January 1971 and extended In addition to the parameter estimates indicated
through the Decemberofthe year prior to that being in Table 1, dummy variables were included in the
4142estimating equations for k, tj , tb g and z for the
sample periods ending in December 1981 through
December 1983. These dummy variables allowed
for the introductionofnationwide NOW accounts in
1981. At the time, that institutional change
was judged to have induced many holders of pass-
book savings accounts and other small time
deposits, which are included in M2 butnotinMl,to
consolidate theirtransactions into
a single NOW account. This consolidation would
have raised the level oftransaction deposits perma-
nently and the growth rate of those deposits tem-
porarily as the process was proceeding. These
changes would, in turn, have affected the levels and
growth rate of k, tl , t2 , g and z. During 1981, the
Federal Reserve published estimates of "shift-
adjusted MIB"6 that excluded that portion of the
NOW account total judged at the time to represent
funds transferred from savings accounts. A detailed
discussion ofthis adjustment ofthe data is given in
Bennett (1982). These estimates suggest that the
consolidation of funds was largely complete by
mid-1981.
The coefficients on the dummy variables in the
fitted equations for k, t j , t2, g and z were not
estimated jointly with the other parameters. They
were chosen to approximate the effect on the com-
ponent ratios of a shift into NOW accounts from
deposits outside M1 of the magnitude represented
by the difference between total and shift-adjusted
Ml as published at the time. Although the coeffi-
cients on the dummy variables do not capture the
exact month-to-month behavior of the difference
between actual and shift-adjusted Ml, they do
represent the general trend in that difference. In
particular, they include the assumption that the shift
offunds into NOW accounts (and thus its effect on
the ratios) was mid-1981. The same
adjustment was imposed on each of the various
component models. The experience here, as with
earlier adjustments ofthis form, is that the ARIMA
coefficients remain stable once this adjustment is
made. Our use of the dummy variable approach
causes no problems for exante forecasts for 1982-84
since the coefficients on these variables were con-
structed with data publicly available in 1981.
Exante forecasts for 1981 raise other difficulties.
At the end of 1980, there was no finn infonnation
available to measure the effect ofnationwide NOW
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accounts on the various monetary aggregates. Our
approach here was to regard the multiplier models
estimatedthrough the endof1980 as appropriate for
forecasting the levels of shift-adjusted MIB during
1981. Shift-adjusted M1B was the aggregate the
Federal Reserve used to guide its policy decisions
during most of that year. However, since the port-
folio shift that necessitated the adjustment in the
essentially completed by the middle
of 1981, the growth rate of unadjusted M1B in the
second halfofthat year was close to the growth rate
ofshift-adjusted MlB. Thus, as far as growth rates
are concerned, the forecasts for the second half of
1981 may be viewed as predictions either of
adjusted or ofunadjusted MlB.
In examining the errors in the forecasts for 1981 ,
we compared the forecasted values with the pub-
lished estimates of shift-adjusted MIB. It must be
recognized, however, that any evaluation of model
forecasts for 1981 is problematic.7 The shift-adjust-
ments to the data were made on the basis of esti-
mates by the Board ofGovernors staffof the extent
to which the introduction of NOW accounts would
cause the public to consolidate their savings and
transactions. Hence, the accuracy of the Board
staff's estimates, and thus the shift adjustments
applied to the data, affected the model forecasting
errors in 1981. Yet even with the benefit of
hindsight, it is impossible to measure the extent of
portfolio shifts precisely since the composition ofa
NOW account between transactions and savings
funds is known only to the accountholder.
One other modification was made to the multi-
plier model before using it to forecast Ml growth in
1981. Preliminary simulations ofthe ARIMA equa-
tions produced particularly large predictionerrors in
the first half of that year. In an earlier paper,
Johannes and Rasche (1981, p. 305) found that the
forecasting accuracy oftheir multiplier model dete-
riorated sharply in 1980 and that this deterioration
was largely attributable to errors associated with the
imposition of credit controls in March of that year.
Examination ofthe "within-sample" residuals from
the estimated ARIMA models in Table 1 revealed
that the equation describing the ratio of non-bor-
rowed reserves to total deposits (rb) significantly
(relative to the standard error) underestimated this
ratio in April and May of 1980.
Although the earliest forecasting experiment inthis study was for 1981 ,the structureofthe ARIMA
model for therb ratio implies that errors in April-
M;ly 1980wouJd h;lve significantlyaffectedthe M1-
forecasts for those same months of1981 if, as seems
possible,the 1980el'rors werethe result Ofauriique
event associated with the imposition and later
removal ofcredit controls and thus not repeated in
1981.A detailed discussion of this issue has been
placedin an Apperidix.Toprevent the fOrecasts of
Ml in 1981 from being contaminated by the 1980
experiencew.ithcredit controls, the ARIMA equa-
tionreported in Table 1for the rb ratio in the sample
period ending in December 1980 was modifiedto
includedummy variablesfor March-May 1980. The
result was a significant reduction of the money
multiplier model's errors in the first half of 1981.
The effect of changes in legal reserve require-
ments on the time series of adjusted nonborrowed
reserves poseda further problem. Eachtime there is
a change in legal reserve requirements (about twice
a year under the phase-in of the new requirements
mandated by the Monetary Control Act of 1980),
the procedure used inconstructing adjusted nonbor-
rowed reserves requires the entire history of the
series to be reconstructed. This is a problem in
principle for the forecasting of the rb ratio since it
means that the historical data used to estimate the
ARIMAmodel for rb through the endofthe preced-
ing year may be different from those available at the
time oftheforecast. In practice, the problem is not
serious since the rb model in Table 1(along with all
other component models) is a model ofthe rate of
change ofrb rather than ofits level. Adjustments to
the history ofthe nonborrowedreserves series when
reserve requirements change are fundamentally
adjustments to the level of the series that preserve
rates of change. The component model therefore
should remain valid even ifthe data are adjustedfor
a changeinreserve requirementsbetweenthe endof
the estimation period and the beginning of the
forecasting period.
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Foreachofthefour sets ofestimated coefficients
in Table 1, four sets ofthree-month ahead forecasts
ofthe component ratios were constructed for the
year following the end of the estimation period.
These •••foursetsofforecastswere fotDecember-
March, March-June, June-September,and Septem-
ber-December. The forecasts of the component
ratios can be·combined to produce forecasts of the
not-seasofldlly-adjustedrioribOrrOwedreserves mul-
tiplierusing the formula in equation 2. However,
since the ..desired output ofthe iorecastingexperi-
mentisseasonally adjustedM1, equation2 mustbe
modified to yield a forecast of the multiplier .con-
necting seasonally adjusted Ml and nonborrowed
reserves not seasonally adjusted. This modification
was made using the seasonal factors that were pub-
lished at the beginning ofeach year for the compo-
nents ofthe monetary aggregates. IfSd, Sk and Stc are
the seasonal factors for transactions deposits, cur-
rency and travelers checks, respectively, the forecast
ofthe multiplierconnecting seasonally adjustedMl





where mrepresents the forecasted value of the
seasonally adjusted multiplier, and R, tl , tz, g, z; rb
and tc represent the forecasted values ofthe multi-
pliercomponents from theindividual ARIMA mod-
els.s
Finally, the forecasts of seasonally adjusted MI
are constructed by multiplying the computed values
of the multiplier, m, from equation 3 by the not-
seasonally-adjusted values ofnonborrowed reserves
plus extended credit in the forecast period.9III. Estimation and Forecasting with the Money Market MOdel
The San Francisco money market model is a
structural model ofthe supplyofanddemand for the
monetary aggreg;ates. A full description ofthever-
sionofthe model used in this paper is provided in
Judd (1984). Given projections ofpersonal income,
prices, the discount rate and the federal funds rate,
dynamic simulationofthis modelyields forecasts of
M1, M2, various othershort-term interestrates, and
the stocks of bank loans and of borrowed and
nonborrowed reserves. 1O
As with the multiplier model, the money market
model was estimated over four overlapping sample
periods. In the case of this model, the sample
periods began in August 1976 and ended in Decem-
ber 1980 to December 1983. The choice ofAugust
1976 as the starting date for all four samples was
dictated by the widely acknowledged fact that the
demand for money shifted in 1974-75. This shift
made model estimates over those years produce
unreliable coefficient values.
Because ofthe pivotal roles played in the model
by the M1 demand function and the equation
explaining bank loans, the coefficients of these
equations in the four sample periods are reported in
Table 2. As indicated earlier, the income, price and
interest rate data used in this estimation were those
available in September 1985, while the monetary
and reserve aggregates were those available shortly
after the end ofeach sample period.
For the three sample periodsending in December
1981, 1982, and 1983, each of which included
1981, a set ofdummy variables also is included to
allow the intercepts of the Ml and transactions
deposits demand equations to shift upward in 1981
and thereby capture the effect of the nationwide
introduction ofNOW accounts. As discussed in the
previous section, this institutional change appar-
ently led some holders of passbook savings and
small time accounts to consolidate their savings and
transactions deposit holdings in a single NOW
account. The result was an upward shift in the
demand for MI. Coefficients on the dummY vari-
ables represent this demand shift. In contrast to our
procedure with the multiplier component models,
these coefficients were estimated directly from the
non-shift-adjusted data. As in the multiplier model,
the size of the upward shift in Ml demand during
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1981 was estimated with dataavailable atthe endof
that year, thus eliminating any problem in using the
shift-adjusteddata to make forecasts for 1982 alld
subsequent years.
The forecasts of M1 made for December 1980-
March 1981 and for March-June 1981 on the basis
ofthe mod~lestimatedthrough December 1980
were treated as forecasts of"shift-adjustedMlB" as
publishedby the Federal Reserve at thattime. As we
pointed out earlier, this adjustment to the data was
made on the basis ofstaffestimates ofthe extent to
which savings funds would flow into new NOW
accounts and thus cause an upward shift in Ml
demand. In forecasting the growth ofshift-adjusted
Ml from March to June 1981, however, an "add
factor" was introduced into the Ml demand equa-
tion to put the model "ontrack" at the beginning of
that period. This add factor was structured so that
any error in the staffsjudgmentofthe demand shift
from Decemberto March, does not affect the model
forecast ofthe M1growth rate from March to June.
Since the shift of funds into NOW accounts
seemed largely completed by mid-1981, and there-
fore affected the growthrateofMl onlytemporarily,
the model simulations for the third and fourth quar-
ters of1981 were regarded as forecasts ofthe growth
rate of non-shift-adjusted MI. For these two quar-
ters, add-factors were again introduced to put the
model on track at the beginning of each forecast
period and thereby ensure that shifts inthe level of
Mldidnot affect the forecasted growth rate. Sincea
shift in money demandofunknown proportions was
anticipated in 1981, an actual forecaster most likely
would have usedthis add-factorprocedure (orsome-
thing like it) to take advantage of the information
about the size of the shift that became available as
th~ yearadvanced. (In forecasting thegrowth rate of
MI·atthe time, the staffofthe SanFranciscoFederal
Reserve Banklargely ignoredthelevel oftheaggre-
gate because it Was known to be distorted by.the
demand shift).
{jnlikethemultipliermodel,.in which forecasted
values depend only on past values ofthe multiplier
components, the money market model is a struc-
turalmodel inwhichforecastsofM1growthdepend
also on the expected course of income and prices.Thisaspect has two implications for the forecasting
experiments. First, because the money market
model uses more information, one would expect,
ceteris paribus, its forecasts of Ml growth to be
subject to smaller errors than those using the multi-
plierapproach. Second, because the model requires
more information, the quality of its forecasts
depends on the accuracy of that information. If
income and price predictions are wide ofthe mark,
the Ml-forecasts generated by the model are likely
also to be poor. Thus, comparing the usefulness of
the structural approach to that of the multiplier
modelrequires striking abalance between these two
conflicting considerations.
We attempted to deal with this dilemma by mak-
ingtwo setsofM1forecasts using the money market
model. In the first set, we used the actual (presently-
available) values of income and prices during each
forecasting period. The resulting Ml forecasts were
those that would have been possible with the model
had the policymaker been able to predict income
and prices perfectly. Clearly, in practice, this would
not be possible, so actual Ml-forecasting errors
would be expected to be somewhat larger.
The second set of MI forecasts used predictions
of the growth rates ofincome and prices made by a
well-known economic consulting firm and pub-
lished close to the beginning of each forecasting
period.ll These forecasts, which may be more
representative of those that an actual policymaker
would have been able to achieve, would be expected
a priori to exhibit greater errors than those gener-
ated under the assumption that future income and
prices are known perfectly. A priori, the forecasting
errors of an actual policymaker using the money
46market model would be expected to lie Qetween
those of the two sets offorecasts generllted in this
article, As it hllppened, the differences between the
two sets offorecasts were small in most cases.
Forellchofthesixtee.n forecllSting experiments,
the forecasted MJ growth rate was constructed by
performing a three-month-ahead dynamic simula-
tion of the model with the actual values of the
monetary <:lJJdcreditaggregatesin the immediately
preceding month presumed to be .l<:nown. Thus., the
forecast of the level of MI in September 1983, for
example, used the model coefficients estimated
using revised data for the sample period which
ended in December 1982, and took as•• given. the
actual value ofMl.forJune 1983 published early in
July. The simulated level ofMl in September llnd
theaCtl~allevel inJune then\vereusedtoconstruct
the forecast ofthe growthrate ofMI.over the three-
month span.12 These simulated growth rates then
were compared with the realizedgro\\Tth r~t:sboth
fromthe preliminarydata publishedduring the year
be;ngforecast (1983 in theaboveexample) andfrom
the revised data published early in the succeeding
year (1984 in the example).
47IV. The Results of the Forecasting Experiments
The results ofthe forecasting experiments are set forecasts for the first halfof 1981 also were regarded
out in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Both the preliminary and as predictions of the shift-adjusted aggregate.
revised actual growth rates ofMl are shown. Since However, since the demand shift was completed by
the multiplier model in the first instance predicts the mid-year and the presence of a lagged, dependent
level of M1 and the size of the portfolio shift into variable in the Ml demand equation adjusts the
NOW accounts in 1981 was not known when the forecasts for upward-shifts in the level of Ml (that
year began, the forecast and actual growth rates for is, the model in the first instance predicts the growth
the multiplier model in that year are for shift- rate of Ml rather than its level), the projections of
adjusted MIB. For the money market model, the growth in the second halfofthe year are regarded as
48projections ofactual(not-shift-adjusted) MI.
Over the four year period as a whole, the mean
error·in forecasting the annualized growth rate of
Ml compared to the preliminary actual data pub-
lisiled immediately after each forecasting period
was 0.46 percent using the multiplier model and
3.06 percent using the money market model
(assuming income and prices were known13). The
corresponding mean absolute errors (that is,.the
average errors without regard to their signs) were
5.07 percent and 4.31 percent respectively.
Examination of Tables 3 and 4 shows that the
different ranking of the two models according to
these alternative criteria largely reflects the fact that
in 1981, the forecast errors from the money market
model were not only large but all in the same
direction making the mean error the same as the
mean absolute error in that year. Bycontrast,the
multiplier model's errOrs in 1981, which also were
large in the absolute sense, were bothpositive and
negative, making the mean error smaller. Again,
however, we should point out that the measured
growth of shift-adjustedMlin 1981 was based on
estimates ofthe amount offunds shifted into NOW
accounts from outsideMl. Thus the size of both
models' forecast errors in 1981 depends· on the
correctness ofthose judgments.
The tendency of the money market·model to
overestimate the growth of shift-adjusted Ml in
1981 was recognized at the time. The explanation
for this over-estimate then suggested (see Bennett
1982) was that Ml growth was slowed in 1981 by
49the massive surge in ownership of money market
mutual funds. Thesefunds providedhigh yields and
allowed some limited check-writing. As a result,
they were strong competitors to the checkable
accounts provided by commercial banks, the yields
on which remained regulated. Thus, at the same
time the nationwide introduction ofNOW accounts
was boosting the growthofM1, the spreadofmoney
funds was reducing it. The shift-adjustment of the
data in 1981, which had the effect of reducing
measured Ml growth, was designed to account for
the first ofthese institutional developments, but no
adjustmentwas made for the second. As aresult, the
model over-predicted shift-adjusted M1 growth.
In fact, inthe first halfof1981 ,the money market
model provided better forecasts of non-shift-
adjusted MlB growth. This suggests that the effects
of the two institutional developments on Ml
demand tended to offset one another. Non-shift-
adjusted M1 grew at an average rate of6.4 percent
in the December 1980-June 1981 period; the money
market model forecast 9.5 percent and the multi-
plier model, 0.7 percent growth. Thus, ifthe com-
parison is made in terms ofthe unadjusted data, the
money market model outperforms the multiplier
model by a significant margin. In the second halfof
1981, the shift of funds into NOW accounts was
largely complete but that from M1 into money
market funds actually accelerated. As a result, both
models overpredicted the growth in both measures
ofMl.
In 1982, the mean absolute error was about the
same for both models. But in 1983 and 1984, the
money marketmodel performedsignificantly better.
Since October 1982, the Federal Reserve's operat-
ing instrument has been the level of borrowed
reserves. This change to a new operating instrument
has resulted in a reduction ofthe short-run volatility
of short-term interest rates compared to the prior
period in which the stock of nonborrowed reserves
was the central bank's policy instrument. As the
short-run volatility of interest rates was reduced,
however, their longer run swings increased. Thus,
one would expect a model using information about
movements in interest rates as well as their impact
on income and prices to have performed better in
this period. By contrast, the components of the
money multipliermay have become more difficultto
forecast as financial deregulation increased the
amount ofshifting offunds among different classes
ofdeposits.
The summary error statistics reported in Table 5
also were computed using the revised actual M1
data publishedearly in the year following that being
forecast. The results did not alter our conclusions
regarding the relative forecasting efficiency of the
two models, but they did reveal one noteworthy
point. The revised forecast errors from the money
multiplier model tended to be larger than those
computed from the preliminary data, whereas errors
from the money market model tended to be a little
smaller. Over the four years as a whole (sixteen
separate forecasts), the mean absolute error of the
money market model was 4.3 percent with respect
50to the preliminary data and 4.0percent with respect
to the revised data. The corresponding error statis-
tiGs for the multiplier model were 5..1 percent and
5.8percent.
We believethatthemostlikely explanationofthis
result is that the process ofrevising the data at the
end ofeach year included revisions tothe seasonal
adjl!stment factors. As we described earlier, the
jections ofnot-seasonally-adjusted MI. Itwas used
to generate seasonally-adjustedMl forecasts by
using the seasonal adjustment factors published ex
ante to modifY the expression which defines the
multiplier in terms of its components (compare
equations 2 and 3). Clearly, if these seasonal adjust-
ment factors were laterrevised, the forecasts derived
from the preliminary factors would tend to exhibit
largererrors.
The forecasts generated by simulating the money
market model are ofseasonally-adjusted MI. Since
the process of revising the seasonals for an eco-
nomic time series tends to yield a "smoother"
series, one expects the forecasting errors from the
revised series to be smaller than those from the
original published series. Our results confirm this
expectation.
However, the fact that the money market model
yielded better forecasts of the revised than.of the
preliminary data may provide little comfort to.the
real world policymaker who frequentlyis forced by
thepressureofevents tomakedecisionsonthe basis
of preliminary data. Nonetheless,·sharp dep<mures
of model forecasts from the preliminary published
datamay alert the policymakerto thepossibilitythat
preliminary data will be significantly revised later
and thus should be treated with caution in making
policy decisions. On occasion, the staff ofthe San
Francisco Reserve Bank has found that model fore-
cast errors are predictors of subsequent data revi-
sions.
V. Conclusion
In summarizing the results of our calculations,
two features standoutas important to policymakers.
First, although the money market model provided
better forecasts in 1983 and 1984, neither model is
clearly better than the other. This conclusion sug-
gests that both the supply conditions emphasized in
the multiplier approach and the demand factors
considered by the moneymarket model play roles in
determining monetary growth. Second, the rela-
tively large errors in forecasting suggest that the
central bank's ability to "finetune" the money stock
in the short-run is very limited. In sixteen separate
forecasts, the multiplier model missed even the
directionofchangeoftheMl growthrate five times;
the missed it three times.
Given that the central bank's control over the
monetary aggregates is necessarily indirect, our
results maketheFederal Reserve's apparent inability
to control MI closely in the short run easy to
understand. The empirical findings of this <micle
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strongly suggest that both the Federal Reserve itself
and the small army of "Fed-watchers" who keep
tabs on its activities from the sidelines should focus
their attention on longer run movements in money
growth.
Given the apparent difficulty offorecasting short-
run movements in money growth, even when either
the federal funds rate or the stock of nonborrowed
reserves is assumed to be fully under the Federal
Reserve's control, it seems unlikely that the central
bankwill be able successfullyto counterunforeseen
developments in the real economy by quickly vary-
ing the rate of money growth. This suggests to us
that an operating procedure that automatically
reverses short-run variations in the rateof money
growth - and therefore does not require Federal
Reserve officials to makejudgementsonthe basis of
forecasts - would tend to produce better long-run
results.ApPENDIX
The Effect of the 1980 Credit Controls
on Estimates of the Money MUltiplier
(A2) Inrbt = Inrbt_1+ (1nrbt- 12
Inrbt- 13) + 1.1273at- 1
+ .3478at_12 - 1.0830at_13
where Inrbtis thepredicted value ofInrbtand at- l'
at- 12 and at_ 13 are the estimated residuals from
those previous periods. This equation in tum can be
rewritten in terms ofthe previous predictions of rb
and the associated prediction errors as:
As pointed out in the text of this article, the
ARIMA model for the rb ratio exhibited large
residuals in April and May of 1980. Although our
forecasts began in 1981, one-time errors in 1980
would have had a significant effect on the M1
forecasts for 1981. This can be seen by rewriting the
estimated ARIMA model for rb in Table 1 as:
Now considerthe implicationofasituationin which
the model accurately forecasts rbt_ 1and rbt- 13, but
predicts a small change in rb from date (t - 13) to
date (t-12) when a large increase actually occurs.
That is, there is a large one-time innovation in the
data at date (t- 12) that is not modeled explicitly.
Under these circumstances, the large positive pre-
diction error at date (t - 12) (at- 12 > 0) would be
carried forward to generate a large positive pre-
dicted change between dates (t- 1) and t through
the .3478at_12 term.
By assumption, this change would not occur in
the actual data series since the experience at date
(t-12) was a one-time occurrence. Consequently,
rbt would be overpredicted by a considerable
amount. Since the elasticity of the multiplier with
respectto rb is - 1.0,the errorin rb would appearas
a large underprediction of the multiplier and the
money stock at t. This phenomenon appears to be at
least partially responsible for the large errors in the
(l - B)(l - B12)[lnrbt - (XoCRlt
- (XICR2t - (X3CR3t] =
(l - 6IB)(1 - 612B12)at
(A4) (1 - B)(1 - BI2)[lnrbt




= (1 + .0320B) (l - .5869BI2)at
(.1020) (.0928)
The first ordermoving average factor is no longer
significant in this specification, and the credit con-
trol dummy variables have signs that are consistent
with an increase in excess reserve holdings (ora
reduction in borrowed reserves) at the initiation of
the credit controls. This effect in March and April
1980 is subsequently, although only partially, offset
as indicated by the negative coefficient on the May
1980 dummy variable.* The effect ofthe inclusion
ofthese creditcontrol dummies is substantialas they
reduce the estimated error of the rb equation by
approximately 9 percent.
In principle, the effect of the credit controls
experience on other component ratios of the multi-
plier also should be investigated. We did not pursue
where CR1, CR2 and CR3 are dummy variablesthat
take the valueoneinMarch, April and May of1980,
respectively, and zero in all other months. The
estimate of equation A3 for the sample ending in
December 1980 is:
(A3)
preliminary forecasts for March and June 1981.
There is no way to estimate accurately the month-
to-Illonth effects.of credit controls in the spring of
1980since we only had the single experience. One
technique involves re-estimating the ARIMA model
for rb with the addition of individual dummy vari-
ables for March-May, 1980. This model would take
the form:
Inrbt = Inrbt_1+ (1nrbt- 12
Inrbt_ 13) + .1273at_1
.6522at_12 - .0830at_13
(AI)
52this investigation here both because no systematic
pattern in the residuals of the other component
ratios was observed during spring 1980 and
because, except in the case of the t} ratio, the
elasticity ofthe multiplier to the remaining compo-
nent ratios is quitelow. Therefore, even ifthe effects
ofthe credit controls filter through to produce fore-
cast errors in these other component ratios, they
shouldexertonlyaminorinfluenceonthemultiplier
forecasts.
The forecasts ofMI for 1981 shown inTable 3are
those computed using Equation A4 to simulate rb
and the other component models in Table 1 to
simulate the other components. Adding the credit
control dummies improved the forecasting perfor-
mance in March and June 1981 dramatically, While
slightly hurting the already bad performance in
September 1981. Over the year as a whole, the
credit control dummies reduced the mean absolute
error in the forecasted annual growth rate of shift-
adjusted Ml from 9.20 percent to 6.78 percent.
*Ifthe effect of the credit controls on the reserve
ratio is strictly temporary, then the sum of the
coefficients on the variables should be zero. The
sum of the three coefficients in equation A4 is
.0394, which suggests, on the surface, that the
impact may not have been fully reversed by the end
ofMay 1980. However, the sum is not significantly
different from zero (s.e. = .0259), so the case for
introducing additional dummies for subsequent
months is weak. Equation A3 could bere-estimated
with the sum of the three coefficients on the credit
control dummies restricted to zero, but that has not
been done for these forecasting exercises.
FOOTNOTES
1. Other reasons for the volatility of M1 growth during the
1979-82 period have been suggested. For example, the
credit control program imposed in 1980 was associated
with very large changes in M1. Some economists have
argued that even in the 1979-82 period, the Federal
Reserve in practice did not attempt to control M1closely in
the short-run.
2. Our forecasts assume that the settings of the Federal
Reserve's policy instruments over the forecast period are
fully known. However, the Federal Reserve itself also
makes M1 forecasts using both econometric and "judg-
mental" methods. If it changed policy in response to these
forecasts, the actualvalues of the policy instruments in our
models may be different from those that an outsider would
have assumed at the beginning of any forecast period.
3. An earlier study examining the forecasting perfor-
mance of both the Johannes-Rasche and San Francisco
models together with several other approaches to fore-
casting M1 is reported in David Lindsey and others,
1981
4. The Federal Reserve typically issues revised historical
datafor the monetaryaggregates in Februaryofeach year.
We used these revised data in our estimations.
5. Occasionally during the October 1979-0ctober 1982
period, the Trading Desk permitted nonborrowed reserves
to diverge from target in orderto avoidtemporary short-run
interest rate fluctuations that were expected to disrupt
financial markets but have little effect on M1 growth.
6. Prior to January 1982, the monetary aggregate that
consisted of currency, demand deposits and NOW
accounts was described as M1 B. Since January 1982, this
aggregate has been termed Mi.
7. This comment applies equally to forecasts from the
multiplier model and the money market model.
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8. In February 1984, the Federal Reserve moved to a
system of contemporaneous reserve requirements (CRR)
from its previous system of lagged reserve requirements.
This institutional change might have altered the statistical
properties of the time-series of the rb ratio and thus
affected our forecasts of the multiplier in 1984. In practice,
tests conducted by Rasche subsequentto the completion
of this article indicate that the effectof CRR on the monthly
behavior of the multiplier has been small.
9. In caseswhere there were revisions to the nonborrowed
reserves series between the end of the estimation period
and the forecast period, the monthly growth rates of the
revised series for nonborrowed reserves were used to
extrapolate the unrevised series from the last available
observation. The resulting constructed values ofunrevised
nonborrowed reserves were multiplied by the forecasted
multiplier to generate a forecast for M1.
10. If either nonborrowed or borrowed reserves were
regarded as the exogenous policy instrument. the model
may be used to derive a forecast of the federal funds rate
as well as the other endogenous variables. This procedure
was not followed in the experiments reported here.
11. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain income
and price predictions made precisely at the beginning of
each forecast period.
12. The procedure was more complicated in 1981. The
firstthree-month forecast (December 1980to March 1981)
was treated as a prediction of "shift-adjusted M1 B" taking
the level of actual M1B in December 1980 as given.
The second forecast (March-June 1981)tookthe level of
shift-adjusted M1 B in March as given and forecast its level
in June after adjusting for the error made by the model in
March. Since the portfolio shift into NOW accounts was
complete by mid-year, the June-September and Septem-
ber-December forecasts were regarded as predictions ofnon shift-adjusted M1B, taking the level of that aggrf;lgate
atthe beginning of each period as given but again adjust-
ing for the errors made in the model forecasts for June and
September.
13, Table 5 shows that the forecasting errors using the
predicted values of personal income and prices rather
than the actual values were almost identical. This reflects
partly the fact that the income and price forecasts we used
were quite good and partly the fact that the short-run
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